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Nick Cowen
INTRODUCTION:
SYMPOSIUM ON ROBUST POLITICAL ECONOMY
ABSTRACT: Mark Pennington’s Robust Political Economy is a systematic
exposition of a framework for analyzing institutional performance. The Robust Pol-
itical Economy framework evaluates institutions according to their ability to solve
knowledge and incentive problems. On grounds of robustness, Pennington combines
insights from Austrian market-process theory and public-choice theory to defend clas-
sical liberalism from several compelling critiques. These include theories of market
failure in economics; communitarian, deliberative-democratic, and liberal-egalitarian
theories of justice; and concerns with social capital, domestic and international
poverty, and ecology.
Keywords: epistemic challenge; Hayek; incentive problem; knowledge problem; Mark Pennington;
Robust Political Economy.
Mark Pennington’s Robust Political Economy (Edward Elgar, ) is a wide-
ranging application of comparative institutional analysis to contemporary
public policy. It is, in addition, an attempt to revive classical liberalism. In
the ﬁve years since its publication, it has inspired and provoked scholars
across the disciplines of social science. Pennington has contributed, in par-
ticular, to debates about the epistemic capacities and limits of political insti-
tutions. This makes Critical Review an ideal forum to explore and criticize
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this inﬂuential work, so I am grateful to the editor for encouraging me to
organize this symposium on the book for publication in the journal.
In this introduction to the symposium, I attempt to put Pennington’s
work into intellectual context and to summarize his contribution. The
papers by Victoria Bateman, Michael Bennett, Andrew Gamble, and
Daniel Layman, and the reply by Pennington speak for themselves.
Circumstances of Time and Place
The fall of the Iron Curtain put an end, for the moment, to the debate over
“communism.” In its stead emerged several more nuanced critiques of
“capitalism.” Economists revived various theories of market failure, bol-
stered by new empirical discoveries in behavioral economics suggesting
that markets produce predictably inefﬁcient outcomes that can be readily
improved through judicious regulation. In political philosophy, egalitarians
and deliberative democrats found the underlying values, outcomes, and
decision processes within market societies desperately wanting. In public
policy, market institutions were criticized for their incapacity to relieve
poverty and ecological problems, both domestic and international, and for
undermining civic virtues. These criticisms pointed not toward the abolition
of market institutions altogether but toward political efforts to complement,
correct, and perfect them. To borrow a phrase from Albert Métin and
revived by John Quiggin (Hazledine and Quiggin ), they exempliﬁed
a “socialism without doctrines.”
At the same time, the world witnessed the apparent success of social-
democratic welfare states in many advanced societies—and then a pro-
longed recession that emerged out of catastrophic failings in ﬁnancial
markets. This left classical-liberal defenses of limited government and
market institutions looking, at best, irrelevant to current policy debates,
and at worst simply wrong (Alves and Meadowcroft ).
In response, Pennington’s book offers a systematic defense of classical-
liberal institutions that engages concerns in political philosophy while
drawing on insights from empirical social science. His case for classical
liberalism is based not on abstract moral grounds but on the alleged
impracticability of socialism without doctrines.
The Idea of “Robustness”
The notion of robustness as applied to political economy has its origins in
a theoretical parallel that David M. Levy () drew between the public-
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choice economist James M. Buchanan’s case for limited government and
“robust” approaches to statistical analysis. Levy explained that robust sta-
tistical approaches sacriﬁce accurate point estimation in order to minimize
measurement error. In parallel, he suggested that robust institutions would
sacriﬁce some of the capacity of well-intentioned public ofﬁcials to do
good in order to minimize the possibility that they would do harm in
cases where they are imperfectly motivated, as public-choice theory
holds is usually the case. While robust statistics are designed to cope
with measurement error, robust institutions are designed to cope with
political actions that are not conducive to the public good.
Peter J. Boettke, Peter T. Leeson, and J. Robert Subrick then expanded
this conception of robustness into the notion of Robust Political Economy
(RPE), an approach to the comparative analysis of institutions with a
speciﬁc emphasis on their ability to cope with not only incentive but
also knowledge problems (Boettke and Leeson ; Leeson and
Subrick ). This dual focus was partly historical, partly analytic in
nature. The historical component can be traced back to the famous “social-
ist calculation debate” between neoclassical market-socialist economists
and the Austrian economists Ludwig von Mises and F. A. Hayek (see
Hayek ). The neoclassical economists argued that socialist planners
could, in principle, make use of the price mechanism to allocate resources
efﬁciently, so long as the prices were given and all actors were perfectly
informed (Taylor ). This left motivational problems as the most
important factors that might keep socialism from performing at least as efﬁ-
ciently as capitalist institutions. Thus, if a socialist regime could impose an
adequate incentive structure or inspire economic actors to shrug off their
self-interested ways, commercial society could be effectively replaced.
However, Mises () and Hayek ( and ) bracketed the ques-
tion of motives. Granting for the sake of argument that incentive problems
could be solved, they contended that benevolent social planners would lack
the knowledge needed to coordinate production for a whole society. Even-
tually, Hayek ( and ) reﬁned this argument into the assertion that
the knowledge essential for social cooperation is dispersed across a society
and is inaccessible to any single individual or agency. Each individual, he
maintained, has access to only a small portion of this knowledge—mostly
knowledge connected to the speciﬁc circumstances of one’s time and
place. Such knowledge is often tacit and therefore impossible to articulate
through formal communication.Moreover, he contended, the natural and
social worlds are dynamic and ever-changing, such that () economic
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actors face uncertainty evenwith respect to “given” knowledge and () new
knowledge has to be discovered (Hayek [] ).
Following Hayek’s lead, several scholars have used the notion of
robustness to support institutions of private property and voluntary
exchange within a framework of the rule of law. They contend that
these institutions are uniquely capable of dealing with the epistemic bar-
riers to human cooperation, as they allow individuals to engage in socially
desirable activity without explicitly coordinating with everyone else in the
economy. Individuals can specialize in ways that make use of their speciﬁc
knowledge and engage in mutually beneﬁcial trade. When these insti-
tutions are combined with a price system, individuals can cooperate
much more extensively, using publicly available estimates of the scarcity
of particular resources, as embodied in prices, to engage in systematic
rational calculation and planning. In this way, market institutions allow
individuals to make use of knowledge that others possess but to which
they do not have personal access.
This account relies on the assumption that prices are not “given” par-
ameters, as the neoclassical economists had assumed in the socialist calcu-
lation debate, but are discovered through trial-and-error entrepreneurial
learning, with feedback provided by the realization of proﬁt and loss. In
this view, entrepreneurs use their personal knowledge to discover other-
wise scarce resources and put them to social use (Hayek ). However,
there are also continuous sources of disequilibrium, including changes in
relative scarcities of resources and new goods, technologies, and pro-
duction processes introduced by other economic actors. Perfect compe-
tition and competitive equilibrium are merely explanatory ideal types
that we should not expect to observe in practice. Competition is never
perfect, but has a tendency to push prices in the direction of equilibrium
(Kirzner [] ). This tendency overcomes the “knowledge
problem” ﬁrst explored in the socialist calculation debate.
When incentive questions are unbracketed, they provide the other half
of the RPE framework. This is where public-choice research enters the
picture. Public choice is the application of neoclassical economic analysis
to non-market situations (Ostrom and Ostrom , ). Buchanan and
Gordon Tullock ([] ) showed that, given the assumption that
political and economic agents have symmetrical motivations, political
processes will allow some people to impose costly externalities on
others. For example, in a regime governed by simple majority voting
and few constitutional limits on economic legislation,  per cent of
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the public can vote to impose a tax on the remaining  per cent, with the
proceeds to be distributed to the majority alone. The same behavior that
generates collective-action problems between self-interested agents in
market situations can produce similarly perverse and harmful outcomes
through the political process. In the worst-case scenario, these collective
outcomes could cause even formally democratic regimes to fall into des-
perate conﬂict over the community’s resources.
Should the assumption of motivational symmetry be made? Some have
argued that it should not, because in the public sphere, cultural norms
militate against the self-interest that is encouraged or allowed in the
private sphere (Friedman , –). Indeed, public-choice scholars
have had to acknowledge that the empirical evidence does not conﬁrm
symmetrically self-interested behavior among political actors (Mueller
; Munger ). However, RPE does not depend on the prediction
that self-interest will be just as pervasive in the public sphere as it is in a
capitalist economy. It is enough that self-interest is a potential problem
that we need to guard against. Few would deny that it is. Thus, the ques-
tion is how best to guard against it.
RPE scholars have followed public-choice scholars in exploring con-
stitutional mechanisms as a way to prevent self-interest from overrunning
politics. When they are well designed, constitutional rules constrain indi-
vidual political actors so that their aggregate impact is to produce socially
beneﬁcial outcomes, just as private actors are constrained in a capitalist
economy. Thus, competitive elections that lead to regular exchanges of
power between parties can help share collective resources more widely.
Super-majoritarian provisions and other constitutional limits on majority
rule can prevent popular coalitions from exploiting minorities (Buchanan
 and ; Meadowcroft ). The separation of powers, typically
between executive, legislative, and judicial branches, can check arbitrary
conduct. Most signiﬁcantly, federal institutions, as well as other forms of
polycentrism or overlapping governance, allow individuals to exercise an
effective right of exit from one local regime to another (Buchanan and
Congleton ; Weingast ). This allows for local variation and
experimentation in policy making, and crucially forces local polities to
compete for inhabitants, reducing their capacity to exploit residents.
This neat outline may obscure the fact that RPE is more than the sum
of its parts: it can explore how incentive and knowledge problems interact
with each other. For example, Pennington () has suggested that
hypothetical constitutional framers, just like real-world policymakers,
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face a signiﬁcant knowledge problem of their own that challenges Bucha-
nan’s constitutional political economy and its reliance on the rational
design of restraints on self-interest.
Pennington’s Contribution to RPE
Pennington’s contribution is unique in the depth and range of its appli-
cations of the RPE framework. Robust Political Economy targets not only
key economic debates about markets but also criticisms of classical liberal-
ism from moral philosophers, sociologists, and ecologists. It applies the
stress tests of robustness to these approaches to see if they can match the
performance of classical liberal institutions under symmetrical conditions.
The result is not only a defense of capitalism in the economic sphere, but
also of polycentricism more broadly understood. Pennington describes
the role of communal, civic, and other sub-national institutions in over-
coming epistemic challenges to successful public policy.
In the introductory chapter, Pennington describes the three key
features of his argument. First is the premise that institutions should be
robust to realistic problems of human social life: limited knowledge and
self-interest. Second is the method of comparative institutional analysis
by which different policy regimes can be evaluated in light of these rea-
listic conditions. Pennington’s comparative approach allows him to
accept many of the premises of his interlocutors, for example, that
market institutions produce manifest imperfections. In response, he
does not try to defend the perfection of market outcomes but asks why
we should expect alternative institutions to perform better. Third is a
reiteration of the distinctively epistemic case for liberal market institutions.
This is different from market institutions’ more widely recognized role of
aligning private interests with socially beneﬁcial outcomes. A common
theme throughout Robust Political Economy is that many proposals
appear superior to markets only when the epistemic dimension is ignored.
Market Failure versus Government Failure
Having laid out the principles of his argument, Pennington dedicates the
second chapter to criticizing a popular economic case for substantial
market regulation: the theory of market failure, both in old and new
forms. Old and new theories of market failure share this common
ground: the neoclassical economic practice of taking as an analytic baseline
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a static equilibrium characterized by perfect competition and complete,
given information. The model of perfect competition then explains the
allocative efﬁciency of markets. In a market where there are sufﬁcient
potential buyers and sellers, and where everyone has perfect information,
competitive prices will reﬂect their marginal products.
These conditions are rarely, if ever, instantiated even for most private
goods, where information asymmetries and other forms of ignorance are
virtually ubiquitous. The neoclassical model is rendered even more irre-
levant when faced with externalities, where the social costs of producing
goods are not appropriately reﬂected in the price; and public goods, where
the beneﬁts of production cannot be excluded from free riders. In these
cases, it is thought, only state allocation can produce efﬁcient outcomes,
because the state can account for the full social costs of production and
compel everyone to contribute to the costs fairly. Old market-failure the-
ories tend to take rationality and knowledge as given and construct scen-
arios, such as scale monopolies or public-goods provision, under which
economic actors would fail to coordinate optimally. New market-
failure theories observe that real-world actors deviate from economic
rationality and thus fail to coordinate in cases where a perfectly rational
and informed Homo economicus would do so.
Pennington notes an important link between market-failure theory
and the neoclassical case for market socialism. Because available resources
and their possible productive ends are already given data, in the neoclas-
sical account, the calculative task of the market economy is relatively
mundane, at least in the ideal scenario. It is possible, in principle, to
produce efﬁcient allocations under a variety of institutional frameworks.
While entrepreneurs carry out the task of allocating resources under a
private-property regime, this role could equally well be carried out by
managers of state-owned or worker-owned ﬁrms. In addition, prices
not only represent information but are also an incentive for self-interested
actors to undertake the most efﬁcient allocation. But there is a wide range
of economic tasks that private-property markets simply cannot do, while
there is nothing, in principle, that socialist alternatives could not do so
long as incentives are taken into account in some way that simulates
private markets. While the popularity of market socialism as a substantive
alternative to private-property markets has waned, the theory that
underlies it has continued to inform less systematic critiques of markets.
Pennington detects an irony here. Although both old and new market-
failure arguments support state regulation, they are frequently based on
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opposed premises. Old market-failure theories assume that essentially,
people are narrowly rational, self-interested utility maximizers. Therefore,
they fail to reach Pareto-efﬁcient outcomes when facing collective-action
problems. New market-failure theories, by contrast, assume that people
are predictably ignorant, with the result that many of their purely
private economic decisions will be suboptimal. A more symmetrical
approach would recognize that the apparent irrationality of economic
agents found through empirical observation may represent the types of
extra-economic motivations that would allow them to overcome collec-
tive action problems that purely self-interested actors would ﬁnd
intractable.
Critically, both new and old approaches assume that economic actors
are helpless—unable to develop their own solutions to manifest social
problems. By contrast, policy makers are modelled as exogenous observers
of suboptimal decisions within markets, who will faithfully correct them if
granted sufﬁcient power to do so. Pennington’s argument is that we
should not posit the ignorance and self-interest of economic actors as bar-
riers to coordination without also acknowledging the parallel constraints
that policy makers face when attempting to correct market outcomes. To
do so is to compare a worst-case market scenario against a best-case pol-
itical scenario. He maintains that there should be some independent
reason to suggest that political actors will behave more beneﬁcently, or
with greater knowledge, in a particular domain of activity before com-
mending a policy alternative to the market.
In order to evaluate institutional performance in cases of widespread
ignorance, Pennington sets out an alternative way of conceptualizing an
economy: as exchange activity between individuals, or catallaxy (Mises
, ). On this account, knowledge of available resources and their
possible uses does not exist prior to trade, and thus the conditions of
perfect competition never obtain. The primary economic problem is
that the knowledge necessary for beneﬁcial cooperative production is
dispersed across a whole community (Hayek ; Lavoie ). The
puzzle is how individuals in some institutional circumstances, despite
their manifest ignorance, nevertheless manage to coordinate and
cooperate to produce socially desirable outcomes in the absence of the
omniscient intelligence that would be necessary to produce a perfectly
efﬁcient allocation of resources.
Pennington contrasts his anti-perfectionist case with what Boettke
() identiﬁes as the defense of capitalism that emerged out of the
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“Chicago School,” which assumes that any existing institutions and out-
comes are necessarily efﬁcient (because if they were not efﬁcient, adjust-
ments would already have been made to make them efﬁcient). By
contrast, the market-failure model assumes that any real-world situation
not obviously characterized by a competitive equilibrium is a sign of inef-
ﬁciency that government intervention can correct. Both models assume
stasis: there is no spontaneous adjustment to problems of knowledge
and coordination over time. Adjustment is either instantaneous or it is
impossible.
To avoid these two extremes, Pennington rejects the assumptions of
perfect competition, complete information, and perfectly rational
actors. Institutions must work in an environment of bounded rationality,
pervasive ignorance, and dispersed knowledge. Market institutions can
never produce equilibrium outcomes, but through a process of trial and
error and adjustment to new information, they may approach equilibrium
in some circumstances. The advantage of this perspective is that it can
explain the reality of economic coordination that is commonly observed
in real-world economies without recourse to the Panglossian assumption
that institutions are always already optimally coordinating. It is this anti-
perfectionist description of markets against which alternative institutions
should actually be compared.
Situated Selves, Social Capital, and Social Justice
In chapter three, Pennington turns to communitarian and deliberative-
democratic critiques of market institutions. For this range of scholars,
which includes Habermas, MacIntyre, and Iris Marion Young, the case
for market institutions rests on an empirically unrealistic and morally unat-
tractive conception of people as autonomous, atomistic individuals. In
reality, these thinkers contend, people are radically situated within their
social world. Attempts to impose rationalist liberal institutions premised
on individual autonomy do not neutrally respect people as separate
persons, but privilege selﬁsh behavior and ultimately alienate people
from their surrounding community. Furthermore, unconstrained econ-
omic liberalism allows the incursion of inappropriate values, attitudes,
and power relations into communal spaces. Instead these should be sites
of moral development and reﬂection, where people are respected as
persons rather than mere means.
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What is the non-market alternative? Scholars in the communitarian
and deliberative traditions often afﬁrm a dialogical, as opposed to an indi-
vidualist, understanding of the self, as well as a range of democratic and
collective political institutions that emphasize the importance of voice
in political decision-making. Democratic and collective institutions
allow people to justify their beliefs and actions in a public forum, rather
than act on private interest alone. They let people widen their conception
of the self, allowing them to coproduce and identify with the shared
values of their community. At its most radical and utopian, this approach
reﬂects a Marxian conception of freedom as individuals acting in a spon-
taneous, authentic social unity. In its less radical form, this approach
advises that market decisions be constrained by overriding democratic
institutions that are uniquely responsive to a community’s interests and
values (Knight and Johnson ).
Paralleling his rejection of agents as rational utility maximizers in
chapter two, Pennington accepts that atomistic individualism is indeed a
ﬂawed conception of human beings. A society premised on untrammelled
selﬁshness would indeed be empirically and normatively bleak. The
bounded rational agents described by Pennington share much in
common with the radically situated agents that communitarians and
democrats afﬁrm. Like the democratic citizens that communitarians valor-
ize, Pennington’s agents participate in social interaction not only to
achieve given ends, but also to discover new ends that are worth pursuing
with others. The question is not metaphysically or psychologically
whether human beings are more or less social, but practically how to
enable them to cooperate peacefully under realistic conditions.
Pennington points out that it is not self-interest that presents the
primary barrier to establishing and pursuing a shared common good.
Instead, it is the epistemic challenge that is inherent to cooperation in
any complex social order. He argues that it is impossible for a deliberative
institution to give voice to all the relevant considerations for establishing a
common good. He draws on empirical research on voter ignorance to
show that even minimal facts relevant to important policy issues are
never understood by any but a minority of those participating in a political
process. As a result, when asked to make decisions that have impacts
beyond their personal experience and expertise, as they are required to
do by centralized political institutions, people systematically err.
While ignorance is the more signiﬁcant challenge facing public
decisions, incentive problems compound it. In the absence of public
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access to essential knowledge, deliberative settings easily succumb to orga-
nized groups with articulate representatives who can best persuade others
that their special interests are aligned with the public good. While the
demand for democratic voice supports equality in the best-case scenario,
it can easily diminish and silence relevant perspectives in reality.
Pennington contrasts these voice-based institutions with exit-based
institutions, including those of the market. In theory, decisions based
on exercising purchasing power through the market undermine equal
participation. In practice, such decisions compare favorably because at
least they allow everyone to participate in generating social outcomes
through a shared process. By contrast, democratic institutions at any sig-
niﬁcant scale necessarily involve alienating all but a fraction of the popu-
lation from actual political inﬂuence. Markets have the additional
advantage of being able to communicate the tacit knowledge of partici-
pating agents. Democratic theorists tend to assume that markets supply
personal incentives—motives, but not reasons—for action. Pennington
argues that the price mechanism has the more fundamental role of supply-
ing information that is critical for reasoning about public decisions. The
estimates of the scarcity and availability of particular resources embedded
in market prices represent the best available information about the social
costs and beneﬁts of particular policies. Leaving incentives aside, this
information is critical for making the best use of society’s available
resources. Moreover, Pennington points out that communities seldom
agree what the best public policy might be on the basis of open debate
and discussion alone. Instead, exit-based institutions allow people to
experiment locally with different sets of policies and communal norms,
generating new knowledge about how they work in practice in a way
that is absent when decisions are taken collectively.
In chapter four, Pennington turns to a parallel critique of classical lib-
eralism that has emerged out of theories of social capital. In this case, the
notion that markets are artiﬁcial and have to be imposed is used not to
condemn markets intrinsically but to argue that they are precarious and
unstable. The basic argument is that peace, security, and a basic justice
system alone are inadequate for commercial societies to operate.
Markets only function in circumstances of widespread trust and social
cohesion. Because social capital is a public good, individuals can reap
the beneﬁts of widespread trust without contributing to it, leading to its
slow erosion. The state must constantly intervene in civil society in
order to shore up the public environment that makes commerce possible.
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In response, Pennington draws on historical evidence to show that
markets have frequently emerged through endogenous evolutionary
social processes rather than formal imposition by a modern state. This
suggests that there are circumstances where markets can operate
without their continued imposition by a powerful state. Developing pre-
vious work with John Meadowcroft (Pennington and Meadowcroft
), Pennington describes the role of the “bridging social capital,” as
opposed to closer social ties, that market activity is capable of sustaining.
Market activity in a civil society generates contact outside of one’s
immediate family and social circle. People are confronted with situations
where they are rewarded for recognizing and satisfying the interests of
those from a diverse range of backgrounds (Meadowcroft , ).
This interaction produces loose ties that permit people from markedly
different backgrounds to trust each other sufﬁciently to engage in com-
mercial relations despite social distance. In essence, a functional market
process produces a continual stream of beneﬁcial interactions between
relative strangers. In turn, it draws in and rewards individuals who offer
beneﬁcial interactions with others, while excluding people whose prac-
tices harm or disadvantage would-be cooperators. In this way, trust
between acquaintances and strangers is cultivated and social assurance pro-
blems are ameliorated (Al-Ubaydli et al. ; Berggren and Jordahl
). This creates an environment where people can more readily con-
tribute to social insurance schemes and public good provision (Brosig-
Koch et al. ; Ockenfels and Weimann ).
In chapter ﬁve, Pennington discusses the issue of social justice. He con-
siders in particular the arguments of Rawls, Dworkin, and Young. From
these liberal-egalitarian perspectives, markets may occasionally produce
efﬁcient outcomes. However, that is insufﬁcient to establish those
outcomes as just. In Rawls’s terminology, market processes reward indi-
vidual assets that are arbitrary from a moral point of view, such as talents,
class position, and inherited resources. For these scholars, the only just sol-
ution is to empower state institutions to allocate resources in a way that
can be justiﬁed, at least in principle, to all members of a political
community.
In order to deduce a fair way to distribute resources, scholars in this
tradition have made use of hypothetical rational-choice mechanisms. In
Rawls’s case, this is the famous original position, where rational, reason-
able representatives of a community, deprived of knowledge of their per-
sonal circumstances and individual beliefs about the good behind a veil of
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ignorance, agree to the principles on which their political institutions
should be based. Similarly, Dworkin uses a hypothetical desert-island
auction that requires equally endowed members of a new isolated com-
munity to bid on all social resources. The result of these thought exper-
iments is a set of principles that reserve a range of civil liberties that
facilitate these rational agents’ autonomous pursuit of their personal con-
ceptions of the good. This is combined with a stringent requirement for
the state to control the distribution of all social resources in a way that
respects the equality of all persons.
Underlying these arguments is a model of idealized agents who are
rational, reasonable, and far-sighted. The assumption is that human
beings should be modeled as rational choosers whose imperfections and
biases can be abstracted away along with their personal histories and cul-
tural peculiarities. The residual is universal agreement on what justice
requires. As in chapter three, Pennington offers an alternative notion of
radically situated, boundedly rational agents. As individuals with their
own unique motivations, histories, and cultural backgrounds, they
cannot be expected to agree to a single universal conception of justice.
In this respect, Pennington notes an important overlap between his and
Young’s critique of constructivist rationalism in theorizing about social
justice. Young is concerned that a supposedly universal scheme of social
justice will inadequately weight the claims of minority communities
who have radically different ways of valuing aspects of the social world.
It is for this reason that she supports deliberative democratic processes
that give a speciﬁc voice to the historically oppressed and marginalized.
Pennington agrees that centralized systems of distribution do indeed
risk ignoring the legitimate claims of minority groups. However, he
suggests that Young does not go far enough. One important step is
giving sufﬁcient weight to minority groups who might value certain
sorts of resources and locations spiritually, or as constitutive of their iden-
tities. The question is, then, why not take the further step of giving weight
to the ultimate minority, the individual with unique ways of valuing the
world and its resources—which cannot necessarily be articulated or
weighed in any centralized process, no matter how democratic?
In more practical terms, Pennington argues that theories of social
justice are too epistemically ambitious. To allocate resources according
to a systematic rule, we must have knowledge of all social resources
(both actual and potential under different rules of cooperation) in order
to judge which institutional framework will optimally serve the
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disadvantaged. In Rawls’s theory, this knowledge includes “basic facts of
social theory,” including scientiﬁc knowledge of psychology and econ-
omics. Yet knowledge in the human sciences is contested because its
subject matter is essentially complex. Meanwhile, more mundane facts
on the ground, regarding available resources and the most efﬁcient pro-
duction techniques, are subject to change and uncertainty. Once again,
the problem of incentives aggravates this epistemic challenge. Granting
states a principled claim on all productive resources in society, Pennington
argues, would discourage individuals from maintaining and developing
useful assets.
What sort of institutions can cope with these challenges? Pennington
proposes a scheme of minimal government that will allow people to dis-
cover better ways of engaging in fair social cooperation through an evol-
utionary process of “ethical learning.” This process is less reliant on policy
makers possessing all the necessary knowledge of a whole political com-
munity, and allows for decisions to respond to facts on the ground and
to changing circumstances. Such institutions are also able to cope with
the fact that reasonable people inevitably disagree about the value of
equality compared to other social goals. Rather than demanding that
society conform to a single notion of social justice, freedom of exit and
entry into different communities would, according to Pennington,
allow people to experiment with different understandings and implemen-
tations of social justice, with the more successful gaining new members,
the less attractive losing popularity.
Poverty, Economic Development, and Pollution
In part two, Pennington establishes the public-policy implications of his
theoretical argument. First he applies his systematic comparative analysis
to the issue of welfare provision.
Proponents of welfare-state institutions tend to assume that classical
liberal institutions will ignore the plight of the poor and sustain rigid
class distinctions. Welfare-state institutions are, therefore, assumed essen-
tial to extend the beneﬁts of social cooperation to all. Pennington argues
that this assumption is not borne out by historical experience. Nascent
welfare states did not ﬁll an institutional vacuum in industrializing societies
but were imposed on a complex overlapping scheme of mutual-aid
societies and private charities. Because the latter schemes were not
imposed from above on poor communities, they were more aligned
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with their needs and priorities as they (and their benefactors) saw them.
While poverty relief may have been relatively meager by today’s stan-
dards, so too were general standards of living. Pennington suspects that,
had private welfare provision been allowed to continue to develop
within a framework conducive to economic growth, it could have
matched or improved on the outcomes of the modern welfare state.
This is because the case for welfare states assumes that market outcomes
are static, unable to respond endogenously to new social problems and
challenges as they arise, while the democratic process is dynamic and
responsive to the needs of the whole community. Both assumptions are
questionable.
Pennington then considers the question of international development.
In a parallel to claims that poor individuals face poverty traps that can be
escaped only through state intervention, many theories of international
development argue that the burdened positions of developing countries
within the global economic order can be ﬁxed only by the deliberate
intervention and support of policy makers in the Western world. Pen-
nington notes, however, that economic research has established the
importance of institutions of the rule of law, freedom of contract, and
secure property rights for sustained economic growth (Acemoglu and
Johnson ; Shleifer ). Addressing this literature, Pennington
adds a speciﬁc epistemic understanding of the case for property rights.
In the neoclassical literature, these rights are primarily established to
resolve incentive problems (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson ).
For Pennington, another key advantage is that they reduce uncertainty
for entrepreneurs in the developing world and the likelihood of systemic
error by policymakers who may be tempted to engage in big, expensive
interventions that crowd out local, endogenous sources of development.
An appropriate acknowledgement of this epistemic challenge of insti-
tutional reform would encourage policy makers in the West to take
special care when advising or offering support to developing countries.
The very incomplete information that remote ofﬁcials necessarily have
means that their interventions could easily cause as much harm as good.
Finally, Pennington turns to the question of environmental protection.
The basic rationale for state involvement is that environmental challenges
are classic public goods or common-pool resource problems that market
institutions are ultimately incapable of addressing.
Pennington delineates two mainstream approaches to environmental
policy. The ﬁrst are “command and control” measures associated with
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direct state regulation and prohibition of harmful activities. The second,
“price-based” measures, are more often associated with neoliberal
attempts to use market mechanisms to ration the right to pollute or use
up a resource, so as to ensure this is not done casually or wastefully.
Drawing on his critique of market-failure theory, Pennington points
out that both policy approaches miss the epistemic challenge inherent
to environmental protection. They both assume that the policy makers
designing the interventions already know what the correct outcome is,
and are merely establishing an incentive and enforcement structure to
achieve it. In fact, the preferred outcome is very often not “given”
because no agent could possess knowledge of all the costs and beneﬁts
of particular production processes, uses of resources, and their impact
on the environment.
As in later work, Pennington describes how property rights may help
overcome this epistemic challenge (Pennington ). Rather than
pricing rights to pollute or banning particular activities across a whole
community, property rights grant individuals and groups ultimate
control over speciﬁc areas and resources. The prospect of continuous pos-
session means that property owners beneﬁt directly from preserving and
cultivating these resources but are also free to experiment in order to dis-
cover better ways of doing so. Property owners may choose to ban certain
activities on the territory they control or set a price for use or access, but
they will do so from a much more informed standpoint than a policy
maker with only a remote interest in the particular resource. To illustrate
the point, Pennington points to the better performance, compared to
public regulation, of private property in conserving the quality of rivers
and forests.
Pennington also addresses more radical proposals for protecting the
environment, and in particular deliberative-democratic and participatory
forms of governance. He suggests plausible cases where mechanisms of
democratic participation will stymie innovation in ecological living. Tra-
veler communities and deep ecologists who experiment in alternative,
low carbon-footprint lifestyles can be understood to be entrepreneurs
of a kind. They act independently to discover and disseminate attractive
ways of living that are attuned to environmental values. Their attempts
to challenge existing social norms are most plausibly blocked not by over-
whelming consumerist practices, which are essentially voluntary, but by
political processes, whose outcomes are compulsory. Pennington draws
on his research on housing regulation to point out that land-use planning
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regulations typically have a conservative bent (Pennington  and
). They are often used to restrict new kinds of developments
aiming at ecological sustainability, rendering such lifestyle experimen-
tation inaccessible to all but the marginal and the wealthy.
Pennington does not claim that any particular conﬁguration of prop-
erty rights will solve all problems, especially in this domain, where extern-
alities are always present. Indeed, no theorist or policymaker could
possibly possess sufﬁcient knowledge to design institutions that ultimately
guarantee environmental protection. Thus, Pennington introduces the
notion of proprietary governance. In essence, having endorsed institutions
that permit an evolutionary process of trial and error amongst participants,
he suggests that such a process should also be commended for discovering
the institutional frameworks themselves.
RPE as an Open-Ended and Progressive Research Program
Throughout his work, Pennington uses the concept of robustness to
defend classical liberal institutions. However, it is critical to distinguish
RPE as a framework of analysis from Pennington’s substantive argument
that classical liberal institutions are more robust than others. It is quite
possible within the RPE framework to argue for institutions that are
not classical liberal insofar as that argument considers the performance
of the institutions in worst-case scenarios. RPE is not pre-committed to
a particular set of institutional answers to the problems of knowledge
and self-interest. As Bateman suggests in this volume, epistemic challenges
are not a trump card held by classical liberals. Instead, their consideration
opens up another perspective on how we should consider institutional
performance.
Conversely, a particular policy—classical liberal or otherwise—might
be robust when holding a particular institutional or cultural environment
constant, while being apt to fail elsewhere. These considerations make
Pennington hesitant to propose any particular instantiation of classical
liberal institutions in contexts where they have not emerged endogen-
ously. Thus, he opposes the imposition of marketization by an external
agency with limited knowledge of the speciﬁc circumstances of the
actors expected to participate in them. This applies especially to inter-
national development. Instead, Pennington suggests that institutions
that have endured over long periods are more likely to possess some
characteristics of robustness, and that commendable meta-institutional
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arrangements are capable of evolving in response to stress, change, and
uncertainty.
Somewhat paradoxically for a framework premised on examining
worst-case scenarios, this approach allows scholars to escape the narrow
conﬁnes of an institutional analysis based on the pessimistic assumption
that the main barrier to social cooperation is the rivalrous, selﬁsh nature
of human beings. It shows that poor social outcomes are not necessarily
the result of irreconcilable conﬂicts between competing interests that
can be resolved only through sheer compulsion. They can instead be
the result of ignorance, which can be ameliorated by better rules,
norms, and institutions.
REFERENCES
Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson. . “Unbundling Institutions.” Journal of
Political Economy (): –.
Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. . “The Colonial
Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation.” American
Economic Review (): –.
Al-Ubaydli, Omar, et al. . “The Causal Effect of Market Priming on Trust: An
Experimental Investigation Using Randomized Control.” PLoS ONE ():
e.
Alves, André Azevedo, and John Meadowcroft. . “Hayek’s Slippery Slope, the
Stability of the Mixed Economy, and the Dynamics of Rent Seeking: The
Mixed Economy and Rent Seeking.” Political Studies (): –.
Berggren, Niclas, and Henrik Jordahl. . “Free to Trust: Economic Freedom and
Social Capital.” Kyklos (): –.
Boettke, Peter J. . “Where Did Economics Go Wrong? Modern Economics as a
Flight from Reality.” Critical Review (): –.
Boettke, Peter J., and Peter T. Leeson. . “Liberalism, Socialism, and Robust
Political Economy.” Journal of Markets and Morality (): –.
Brosig-Koch, Jeannette, Christoph Helbach, Axel Ockenfels, and JoachimWeimann.
. “Still Different after All These Years: Solidarity Behavior in East and
West Germany.” Journal of Public Economics (–): –.
Buchanan, James M. [] . “Criteria for a Free Society.” In idem, Federalism,
Liberty, and the Law. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, James M. . “Same Players, Different Game: How Better Rules Make
Better Politics.” Constitutional Political Economy (): –.
Buchanan, James M., and Roger D. Congleton. . Politics by Principle, Not Interest:
Toward Nondiscriminatory Democracy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. [] . The Calculus of Consent:
Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Friedman, Jeffrey. . “What’s Wrong with Libertarianism.” Critical Review ():
–.
Cowen • Robust Political Economy 
Hayek, F. A., ed. . Collectivist Economic Planning. London: Routledge.
Hayek, F. A. . “Economics and Knowledge.” Economica (): –.
Hayek, F. A. . “Socialist Calculation: The Competitive ‘Solution.’” Economica 
(): –.
Hayek, F. A. . “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” American Economic Review 
(): –.
Hayek, F. A. [] . “Competition as a Discovery Procedure.” In idem, New
Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Hazledine, Tim, and John Quiggin. . “No More Free Beer Tomorrow?
Economic Policy and Outcomes in Australia and New Zealand since .”
Australian Journal of Political Science (): –.
Kirzner, Israel M. . “Entrepreneurial Discovery and the Competitive Market
Process: An Austrian Approach.” Journal of Economic Literature (): –.
Kirzner, Israel M. [] . Competition and Entrepreneurship, ed. Peter J. Boettke
and Frédéric E. Sautet. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Knight, Jack, and James Johnson. . “The Priority of Democracy: A Pragmatist
Approach to Political-Economic Institutions and the Burden of Justiﬁcation.”
American Political Science Review (): –.
Lavoie, Don. . “The Market as a Procedure for Discovery and Conveyance of
Inarticulate Knowledge.” Comparative Economic Studies (): –.
Leeson, Peter T., and J. Robert Subrick. . “Robust Political Economy.” Review of
Austrian Economics (–): –.
Levy, David M. . “Robust Institutions.” Review of Austrian Economics (–):
–.
Meadowcroft, John. . The Ethics of the Market. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Meadowcroft, John. . “Exchange, Unanimity, and Consent: A Defense of the
Public Choice Account of Power.” Public Choice (–): –.
Meadowcroft, John, and Mark Pennington. . Rescuing Social Capital from Social
Democracy. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
von Mises, Ludwig. . “Die Wirschaftsrechnung im sozialistischen Gemeinwesen.”
Archiv fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik : –. Trans. as “Economic
Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” in Hayek .
von Mises, Ludwig. . Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, rd rev. ed. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
Mueller, Dennis C. . “The Importance of Self-Interest and Public Interest in
Politics.” Critical Review (): –.
Munger, Michael C. . “Self-Interest and Public Interest: The Motivations of
Political Actors.” Critical Review (): –.
Ockenfels, Axel, and JoachimWeimann. . “Types and Patterns: An Experimental
East-West-German Comparison of Cooperation and Solidarity.” Journal of
Public Economics (): –.
Ostrom, Vincent, and Elinor Ostrom. . “Public Choice: A Different Approach to
the Study of Public Administration.” Public Administration Review (): –.
Pennington, Mark. . “Budgets, Bureaucrats and the Containment of Urban
England.” Environmental Politics (): –.
 Critical Review Vol. , Nos. –
Pennington, Mark. . “Public Choice Theory and the Politics of Urban
Containment: Voter-Centred versus Special-Interest Explanations.” Environment
and Planning C: Government and Policy (): –.
Pennington, Mark. . “Hayekian Political Economy and the Limits of Deliberative
Democracy.” Political Studies (): –.
Pennington, Mark. . “Democracy and the Deliberative Conceit.” Critical Review
(–): –.
Pennington, Mark. . Robust Political Economy: Classical Liberalism and the Future of
Public Policy. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar.
Pennington, Mark. . “Elinor Ostrom and the Robust Political Economy of
Common-Pool Resources.” Journal of Institutional Economics (): –.
Pennington, Mark. . “Constitutional Political Economy and Austrian
Economics.” In The Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics, ed. Peter J.
Boettke and Christopher J. Coyne. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Shleifer, Andrei. . “The Age of Milton Friedman.” Journal of Economic Literature 
(): –.
Taylor, Fred M. . “The Guidance of Production in a Socialist State.” American
Economic Review (): –.
Weingast, Barry R. . “The Economic Role of Political Institutions: Market-
Preserving Federalism and Economic Development.” Journal of Law,
Economics, & Organization (): –.
Cowen • Robust Political Economy 
